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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
MARTIN L. HOCKING, and JUDITH
C. HOCKING,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
CASE NO. 91505
Priority No. 11
MERLYN TINGEY ROBERTS, n/k/a
MERLYN TINGEY de la MELENA,
Defendant and
Appellee,

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction over this case is vested in this Court pursuant
to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 3 (1991).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in

ruling that appellee Merlyn de la Melena was entitled to summary
judgment determining the long-standing fence line the legal boundary under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.
2.

Whether the trial court erred in finding that no genuine

issues of material fact exist to preclude summary judgment entered
against appellants.
3.

Whether appellants are entitled to costs.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine

issues

of material

fact

and

judgment as a matter of law.

the moving

party

is entitled

to

Utah State Coalition of Senior

Citizens v. Utah Power & Light, 776 P. 2d 632, 634 (Utah 1989); Utah
R. Civ. P. 56(c).

The burden of establishing the non-existence of

a genuine issue of material fact is, of course, on the moving
party.

See e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).

However, once the moving party has met this initial burden, the
burden shifts to the non-moving party, to designate "specific facts
showing there is a genuine issue for trial.11 Celotex, 477 U.S. at
324.

It is essential to note that the non-moving party in a

summary judgment "must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."

Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

The

central inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury whether it is so onesided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. " Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).*
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On or about September 27, 1990, appellants Martin L.
Hocking

and

Judith

C.

Hocking

(hereinafter

referred

to

as

"Hockings" or "appellants") through their counsel, Hollis S. Hunt,
filed a complaint in the Second Judicial District Court against

lr

The Utah Court of Appeals has expressly approved of and adopted the United States
Supreme Court's approach to summary judgment set out in Celotex. See, e.g., Reeves v.
Gigy Pharmaceutical, inc., 764 P.2d 636, 642 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 262, 264 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Moreover, when the Utah
rules are modeled after the federal rules, Utah courts often look to federal decisional law
to assist in application of procedural devices. See, e.g., State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294, 1299
(Utah 1986); Nelson v. Stoker, 669 P.2d 390, 392-93 (Utah 1983). Because Utah R. Civ. P.
56(c) is modeled after and virtually identical to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, this Court may follow
recent United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting summary judgment standards.
Utah case law has long interpreted the shifting of burdens between the movant and
nonmovant to be the same procedural vehicle described by the Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
Dupler v. Yates, 351 P.2d 624 (Utah 1960).
2

appellee Merlyn Tingey de la Melena (hereinafter referred to as "de
la Melena" or "appellee") to quiet title on a 12f x 120f strip of
property.

(See R. 1-10.)

On May 6, 1991, appellants filed a

notice of request for withdrawal of their counsel, Hollis S. Hunt,
and entered a notice of appearance as pro se plaintiffs, filed a
motion to amend and supplement the complaint, and filed a motion
for summary judgment against de la Melena. (See R. 34-237. ) De la
Melena filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and a hearing was
held before the trial court on September 3, 1991.

(See R. 606-

706. ) The trial court issued a ruling and an order granting de la
Melena1s motion for summary judgment.

(See Exhibit "1" and R.

913. )
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Hockings and de la Melena are adjoining landowners in
Centerville, Utah.

(The party!s respective lots are hereinafter

referred to as the "Hocking lot" and the "de la Melena lot"; see
drawing of property and fence configurations in case, attached as
Exhibit "2".)

In 1947, William Tingey and Sylvia Tingey, who are

the parents of de la Melena, purchased the de la Melena lot from
William Evans.

William Tingey understood that they had purchased

a lot that consisted of 100 feet from north to south.

Tingey

cleared the rocks and dead trees off the lot and began farming over
to what he thought was the boundary line, where the existing fence
stands between the de la Melena and Hocking lots.

He assumed that

someone had "stepped off" the 100 feet to the now existing fence
line, but he does not know how many feet he farmed.

(See William

Tingey depo. at 6-7, 11-12 and 19-21, attached as Exhibit "3".)
3

From 1947 to 1978, Tingey plowed, farmed and irrigated the entire
de la Melena lot, up to the point where the existing fence line is
situated.

(See Tingey depo. at 11 and 19-20, Exhibit "3".)

On or about October 24, 1953, Milton C. Green purchased the
Hocking lot from Therice H. Duncan and Oretta M. Duncan.

(R. 652. )

In 1953 or 1954, shortly after moving into the Hocking home, Green
erected the now existing chain-link fence pursuant to a survey.
(See Milton C. Green depo. at 7-9, attached as Exhibit "4".)

Prior

to the chain-link fence that Green built in 1953, there existed an
old post and wire fence that, according to Green, had been in place
for at least fifty years.

(See Green depo. at 7-8, Exhibit "4".)

Green testified that he and Tingey discussed the placement of
the fence line and agreed that it would constitute the boundary
between the lots.
664.)

(See Green depo. at 8-9, Exhibit "4" and R. 663-

After the fence was built in 1953, until 1978, twenty-five

years later, Tingey continued to plow, plant crops, irrigate and
farm right up to the fence.

(See Tingey depo. at 13-14, Exhibit

"3" and Green depo. at 12, Exhibit "4".)

From 1953 to 1963, the

period Green owned the Hocking lot, Green was never aware of any
discrepancy between the fence line and the legal description of the
lots.

William Tingey, nor anyone else, ever discussed a discrepan-

cy with Green during these ten years.

(See Green depo at 10-13,

Exhibit "4" and R. 663-664.)
On or about February 18, 1963, Green sold the Hocking lot to
Albert J. Madsen and Jean F. Madsen.
later, on January

(R. 666.)

2, 1969, Martin and

Nearly six years

Judith Hockxng had

the

Hocking lot surveyed prior to purchasing the lot from the Madsens.
The survey indicated a discrepancy of about 12 feet between the
4

fence

line

and

the

record

title

boundary

line.

(R.

668.)

Notwithstanding the discrepancy in the survey, on March 19, 1969,
Martin

and

Madsens.

Judith Hocking
(R. 670.)

purchased

the Hocking

The Hockings never notified

lot

from

the

the Tingeys

regarding the 1969 survey or concerning a discrepancy in the fence
line.

(R. 680. ) Tingey did not know of a discrepancy in the fence

until the Hockings brought the matter up with de la Melena sometime
in 1989.

(See Tingey depo. at 12-13, Exhibit "3".)

On or about February 14, 1978, the Tingeys conveyed to de la
Melena the de la Melena lot through a warranty deed.

(R. 692. ) De

la Melena was not aware of a discrepancy in the fence line when she
purchased the lot.
Exhibit "5".)

(See de la Melena depo. at 20, attached as

The Tingeys ordered a survey on February 21, 1978

for de la Melena so that she could use the west portion of the lot
as collateral for her house.

The survey showed that the existing

fence line encroached on the Hockings* deeded property approximately 12 feet.

(See Tingey depo. at 13-14, Exhibit "3"; de la Melena

depo. at 11-12, Exhibit "5"; and R. 694. ) 2

De la Melena testified

that she may have looked at the survey when she received it in
1978, but did not recognize the discrepancy in the fence line.
(See de la Melena depo. at 12, Exhibit "5".)
Shortly after the de la Melena lot was conveyed to de la
Melena

and

her

now

deceased

landscaped the property.

husband,

they

built

a

home

and

On the disputed strip of property, they

planted raspberries, installed a small wire fence to support the

2

The survey also shows that a fence running east and west on the de la Melena lot and
a garage on the Clarence Sanders1 property encroaches approximately nine feet into the
de le Melena lot. (See Exhibit "2" and R. 356.)
5

berries, planted fruit-bearing bushes, fruit trees and a lawn.
They also installed a sprinkling system on the disputed strip,
(See de la Melena depo. at 10 and 16-18, Exhibit "5".)
Neither the Hockings nor any previous owners of the Hocking
lot ever cultivated, irrigated, farmed, manicured or improved in
any way the disputed strip of property.

(R. 674-675.)

Martin

Hocking has annually repaired the chain-link fence for mule deer
damage.

The Hockings also use the fence as a trellis and regularly

trim the growth on the fence.

In 1978, Martin Hocking repaired the

damage to the fence caused by the builders of de la Melena f s home.
In 1989, the Hockings extended the height of the fence.

(R. 676-

677. )
After negotiations had failed between the parties for the
Hockings to purchase the vacant west portion of the de la Melena
lot, the Hockings on October 10, 1989, thirty-six years after the
chain-link fence was installed, notified de la Melena that they
were revoking what they described as their "tacit license" allowing
her to use the disputed strip of property.

(R. 696. ) On September

27, 1990, the Hockings filed suit against de la Melena to quiet
title to the disputed strip of property.

(R. 1-10.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Hockings' contention that the warranty deeds, the 1969
survey received by the Hockings, and the 1978 survey ordered by
Tingey constitutes prima facie evidence that there was no mutual
acquiescence in the long-standing chain-link fence as a boundary
reflects a misunderstanding of the boundary by acquiescence doctrine.

There is no authority whatsoever for the Hockings' position
6

that notice of a "true boundary line11 in the fixing of a fence line
is prima facie evidence of a lack of mutual acquiescence.
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court in Staker v. Ainsworth, 785
P. 2d 417 (Utah 1990) completely eradicated uncertainty as a factor
from the boundary by acquiescence doctrine. Whether a boundary was
uncertain or in doubt at the time that it was acquiesced in, or
whether the boundary was known and certain, is irrelevant to the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.

Uncertainty is now only a

factor in the boundary by agreement doctrine.

Staker's rejection

of the confusing intermingling of these doctrines accords with well
reasoned authority that refute the notion that certainty of the
proper line precludes mutual acquiescence in boundary by acquiescence cases.

Moreover, a presumption, uncontroverted by a showing

of certainty, that any dispute over the boundary line has been
reconciled promotes the boundary by acquiescence doctrine's policy
to preclude litigious boundary disagreements that bear ill will
towards neighbors and clog the court dockets.
Even if uncertainty were still a factor in the boundary by
acquiescence doctrine, the Hockings fail to designate

specific

genuine issues of material fact to controvert the presumption of
acquiescence in this case.

The undisputed material facts in this

case establish as a matter of law that there was mutual acquiescence in the fence line for a sufficient period of time.
Finally, equitable principles support summary judgment for de
la Melena.

For at least thirty-six years, the owners of the

Hocking and de la Melena lots have relied on the fence as the true
and proper boundary.

It would be grossly unfair at this point and

time to consider the fence as anything but a fixed boundary line.
7

ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR AS A MATTER OF LAW
IN DETERMINING THAT THERE WAS MUTUAL ACQUIESCENCE
IN THE LONG-STANDING FENCE LINE AS A BOUNDARY.
The Hockings erroneously argue that the warranty deeds, the
1969 survey received by the Hockings, and the 1978 survey ordered
by Tingey constitute "prima facie evidence" that there was no
mutual acquiescence in the long-standing fence line as a boundary.
The Hockings are flatly wrong.

The warranty deeds and surveys in

this case do not constitute "prima facie" evidence of a lack of
mutual acquiescence.

Nor does such evidence controvert the trial

courtfs finding that as a matter of law there was mutual acquiescence in the fence as a boundary.
In Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P. 2d 417 (Utah 1990), the Supreme
Court affirmed a trial court's summary judgment employing the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence to establish fence lines as
property boundary lines, rather than those established by record
title.

The court reaffirmed that the doctrine by acquiescence

includes only four factors:
1.

Occupation up to a visible line marked by
monuments, fences, or buildings;

2.

Mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary;

3.

For a long period of time; and

4.

By adjoining landowners.

Id. at 420.
The trial court in this case held that based on the evidence
proffered by the parties it was uncontroverted that these four factors were met by de la Melena.

On appeal, the Hockings concede

8

that each factor was met by de la Melena, except for mutual acquiescence.
A.

Because a Sufficient Period of Time had Already Run
for Acquiescence, Evidence of the 1978 Survey is
Academic.

In arguments I-III, the Hockings contend that mutual acquiescence ceased in 1978, upon the taking of a survey ordered by
William Tingey. The Hockings are mistaken. Acquiescence continued
from the erection of the chain-link fence in 1953 until 1989, when
the Hockings first notified de la Melena of a boundary dispute.
However, because twenty-five years from the erection of the chainline fence in 1953 had passed before Tingey ordered the 1978
survey, it is unnecessary for this Court to determine whether
mutual acquiescence ceased upon the taking of the 1978 survey.
Staker held that twenty-years was a sufficient period of time to
establish the third element in boundary by acquiescence, although
a lesser prescriptive period would be appropriate under unusual
circumstances.

Ld. at 420.

Even if the fence were installed in

1956, as the Hockings allege in their statement of facts, twentytwo years would have passed before the 1978 survey, which is still
a sufficient time to establish boundary by acquiescence. Whatever
significance the Hockings attach to the 1978 survey and their
allegation the fence was erected in 1956, is irrelevant to the
application of the boundary by acquiescence doctrine in this case.
B.

Staker v. Ainsworth Completely Eradicated Factor of
Uncertainty From Boundary by Acquiescence Doctrine.

The Hockings! remaining argument that the warranty deeds and
their 1969 survey constitute prima facie evidence of a lack of
9

mutual acquiescence misconstrues the law.

There is no authority

that certainty or knowledge in a boundary line constitutes prima
facie evidence of a lack of mutual acquiescence.

Moreover, it is

implicit in Staker v. Ainsworth that uncertainty is no longer a
factor in the boundary by acquiescence test.
1.

Staker Recognized Clear Distinction Between
Doctrines of Boundary by Acquiescence and
Boundary by Agreement,

The Hockings* tortured "prima facie" theory is premised on a
confusing intermingling of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
with that of boundary by agreement.3 Holding that there* is a clear
distinction between these two theories, Staker overturned Halladay
v. Cluff, 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984), rev'd 785 P.2d 417 (1990),
which required that the claimant prove objective uncertainty as to
the actual location of the property line.
Halladay1s requirement of objective uncertainty was the result
of the confusion between the separate doctrines of boundary by
agreement and acquiescence. Originally, uncertainty or dispute was
required only for boundary by agreement.
503.

Halladay, 685 P. 2d at

In 1928, however, the supreme court in Tripp v. Bagley, 784

Utah 57, 276 P.2d 912 (1928), cited by Halladay as support for its
imposition of the objective uncertainty requirement, begin to refer
to uncertainty or dispute as an essential ingredient for boundary

3

Staker noted that boundary by agreement is premised on a contractual theory and
requires: "(1) an agreement, (2) between adjoining landowners, (3) settling a boundary that
was uncertain or in dispute, and (4) executed by actual location of a boundary line." Id.
at 423 n.4 (quoting Backman, The Lawf of Practical Location of Boundaries and the Need
for an Adverse Possession Remedy, 1986 B.Y.U.L.Rev. 957, 965-82 (emphasis added)).
10

by acquiescence-4

Tripp held the doctrine of boundary by acquies-

cence to be not applicable because the evidence

affirmatively

demonstrated that when the boundary fence was erected, the parties
knew that it was not on the true line, and further, they could not
have believed it to be on the true line since the true line was
straight north and south along a section line, and the boundary
fence had sharp angle turns in it.

Id.

As Staker noted, however,

Tripp involved a parol agreement and therefore should not have been
decided as a boundary by acquiescence case.

Id. at 422-23.

Staker did not simply obviate the burden of proving objective
uncertainty on the party relying on the boundary by acquiescence
doctrine.

The court repudiated the out-dated and sterile notion,

initially developed in Tripp, and now latched onto by the Hockings,
that the absence of uncertainty in fixing the boundary proves there
was no acquiescence between the parties.

Criticizing the language

in Tripp that long served as the basis for recognizing uncertainty
as an element of boundary by acquiescence cases, Staker stated:
Cases which followed Tripp seized upon this
dicta, which we now deem to be unfortunate in
its impact, and intermittently began to refer
to a showing of uncertainty or dispute in a
boundary by acquiescence context.

4

In Wood v. Myrup, 681 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1984), which the Hockings cite as
controlling authority in this appeal, the element of uncertainty appears to have served as
a basis for the Supreme Court f s decision. Wood was authored by Justice Oaks just prior to
his opinion in Halladay v. Cluff, and in light of Staker, is no longer controlling authority
that certainty in a deed line controverts as a matter of law the presumption of boundary
by acquiescence.
5

Tripp was cited in 12 AmJur.2d Boundaries, § 85 (1964) as an exception to the rule that
[t]he cases approving the doctrine of acquiescence generally do not differentiate between
cases where the boundary was uncertain or in doubt at the time that it was acquiesced in
and in cases where it was known and certain."
n

11

Id. at 422.6

Staker makes clear that uncertainty is a factor in

boundary by agreement and not of boundary by acquiescence. Uncertainty and dispute are important in boundary by agreement cases to
overcome a statute of frauds bar to an oral agreement.

Id. at 423.

These elements, however, have no relevance whatsoever to a boundary
by acquiescence analysis.
Stakerfs rejection of the intermingling of the doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence with the boundary by agreement doctrine
accords with courts and commentators who refute the notion that
certainty of the original line precludes mutual acquiescence in
boundary by acquiescence cases.
Other courts, however, recognizing the doctrine of boundary by agreement as distinct
from that of boundary from acquiescence declare that from acquiescence to the statutory
period arises as a direct and conclusive
inference, not of an agreement, but that the
boundary acquiesced in is actually the true
boundary, not to be controverted by evidence
and unaffected i?~; the existence or non-existence of a disp.ze or uncertainty concerning
the original line.
7 A.L.R. 4th, Fence as Factor in Fixing a Boundary Line, 1f 2[a]
(1981) (emphasis added).
6

The following language in Tripp was specifically criticized by Staker:
[0]ne of the requisites necessary to the establishment of a
boundary line other than the true boundary line between
adjoining landowners by oral agreement or acquiescence . . . is
that the location of the true boundary sought to be thus
established is or has been uncertain or in dispute.
It thus becomes of controlling importance to determine whether
two adjacent landowners may establish a boundary line between
their lands by oral agreement or by acquiescence for a long
period of time, when there is no uncertainty as to the location
of the true boundary line. . . .

Staker, 785 P.2d at 422 (quoting Tripp, 74 Utah at 67 k 69, 276 P. at 916 & 917)
(citations omitted in first quote) (emphasis included in Staker).
12

Nor does the fact that the Hockings were privy to a survey in
1969 that revealed a discrepancy between the fence line and the
deed line controvert the mutual acquiescence in this case. Staker
also expressly discarded the notion rooted in Tripp and articulated
in Halladay that a claimant is precluded from showing mutual
acquiescence if the claimant knew or had reason to know the true
location of the boundary during the period of acquiescence.
Staker repudiated

the second sentence, as well as the first

sentence in the following language in Halladay:
Unless it is shown that during the period of
acquiescence there was objectively measurable
circumstance in record title or in the reasonably survey information (or other technique by
which record title information was located on
the grounds) that would have prevented a
landowner, as a practical matter, from being
reasonably certain about the true location of
the boundary. By the same token, a claimant
cannot assert boundary by acquiescence if he
or his predecessors in title had reason to
know the true location of the boundary during
the period of acquiescence.
Staker, 785 P.2d 421 (quoting Halladay, 685 P.2d at 505) (emphasis
added).7

Staker noted that these two sentences mean "there must

'Justice Howe in Halladay v. Cluff concurred with the second sentence quoted above
on the limited grounds that both parties had access to a survey which indicated that they
did own to the fence to which they claimed. Id. at 513. Although he suggested that
perhaps a reasonable standard could be used in cases "where the discrepancy was apparent
and the acquiescence was blindly indulged in," he warned that "we must not expect too
much from the rule since being familiar with the legal description of one's property and
locating that description on the land are two entirely different things. That is why surveys
are made." Id.
Even if Justice Howefs suggested approach had been followed by Staker, the
Hockings still lose on summary judgment. Both parties did not have access to a survey
indicating that they did not own to the fence. The Tingeys were not privy to a survey until
1978, well after the 20 year prescribed period for mutual acquiescence. Moreover, there
is no issue of fact that the acquiescence was blindly indulged in. The Tingeys had no reason
to know that the fence was not on a true line. As Justice Howe noted:
The rule would serve well in instances like Tripp v. Bagley,
supra, where an old fence line had several angle turns in it
13

have been a particular form of dispute, " a concept that Staker
disparages
doctrine.

as
Id.

inconsistent

with

the

boundary

by

acquiescence

The fact that the Hockings are not even claimants

in this case, compounded with their failure to notify de la Melena
and

her predecessors

in interest of

a

"boundary

problem"

the

Hockings allegedly knew about in 1969, further compels a rejection
of the Hockings1 prima facie argument.

Adoption of the Hocking

position would undermine Staker' s well-reasoned analysis and, as
developed later in this brief, would be patently unfair.
2.

Facts In Staker v. Ainsworth Are Compelling
That Notice To Landowners Of A "True Boundary
Line" Does Not As A Matter Of Law Controvert
Acquiescence In A Fence Line As A Boundary,

Staker concluded there was mutual acquiescence in the fence
line as a boundary, despite the undisputed facts before the court
that the landowners had notice through surveys that the fence line
was not in accordance with the deed line.

A survey taken in 1953

or 1956 showed that the true boundary line between the Teeples,
predecessors in interest to the Maxfield

(non-claimant/appellant)

property, and Ainsworth (claimant/appellee) was approximately 80
feet south of the existing fence line.
this discrepancy,

Teeples reconstructed

In 1956, notwithstanding
the fence on the same

whereas the true line was straight north and south along the
section line; and Madsen v. Clegg, supra, where the boundary
fence ran on a straight line, whereas the deed lines of both
parties provide angle turns in them. In both cases the landowner had reason to note that the fence was not on a true line.
Id. at 513-14. In this case, not only did Tingey not have access to a survey, the fence line
and the true line run parallel and are not interrupted by abrupt turns. Simply put, there
is no noticeable discrepancy between the location of the fence line and Tingey1 s 1947
warranty deed. See Universal Inv. Corp. v. Kingsbury, 26 Utah 2d 35, 484 P.2d 173 (1971).
Even if this Court were to follow Justice Howe ! s recommendation, the Hockings would still
fail to prevail against the trial court ! s summary judgment.
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boundary line as the previous fence shortly after the original
fence was destroyed in a storm,

(See Brief for Appellee Ainsworth

at 3, 11, and 19 & Brief for Appellee Staker at 17, attached to
record at R. 700-703, 705.)

In 1972, Maxfield had a survey taken

in connection with his purchase of his property.

The survey again

revealed the difference of approximately 75 feet between the legal
description and the fence line.

(See Brief for Appellant Maxfield

at 18 & Brief for Appellee Staker at 4, attached to record at R.
708, 710-) In 1979, the Stakers had a survey performed which indicated a discrepancy of about 80 feet between the fence lines and
the record title boundary lines on both sides of the property.
Staker, 785 P. 2d at 419.

Finally, in 1981, Ainsworth had his

property surveyed and also found a similar discrepancy.

Id.

The surveys taken in 1953 or 1956, 1972, 1979 and 1981 serving
notice to the landowners that the fence line was not the "true
boundary line" were immaterial to the question in Staker of whether
there was mutual acquiescence.

Despite this abundance of previous

survey information available to the landowners, Staker expressly
noted that acquiescence ceased only in 1985 when the first claim
regarding the dispute was filed.

The court held as a matter of law

that the longstanding

fence line was the boundary between the

adjoining landowners.

Boundary by acquiescence was established

under facts demonstrating that the adjoining landowners acted in a
manner consistent with the belief that the fence line was the
boundary, irrespective of the various landowners1 surveys giving
the parties notice that the fence line was not on the deed lines.
Id. at 420-21.
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3.

Presumption Of Acquiescence Uncontroverted By
Certainty Of Deed Line Promotes Policy Underlying Boundary By Acquiescence Doctrine.

Finally, a presumption, uncontroverted by a showing of certainty, that any dispute over the boundary line has been reconciled
accords with the boundary by acquiescence doctrine's policy to preclude litigious boundary disagreements that bear ill will towards
neighbors and clog the court dockets.

Staker states:

The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
derives from realization, ancient in our law,
that peace and good order of society is [sic]
best served by leaving at rest possible disputes over long established boundaries. Its
essence is that where there has been any type
of a recognizable physical boundary, which has
been accepted as such for a long period of
time, it should be presumed that any dispute
or disagreement over the boundary has been
reconciled in some manner.
Id. at 423 (quoting Baum v. Defa, 525 P.2d 725, 726 (Utah 1974)).
Eliminating the factor of "uncertainty" from the boundary by
acquiescence doctrine simplifies the application of the doctrine
and is fair.

Landowners may rely on recognizable boundary lines in

existence for twenty plus years without fear that an undisclosed
survey

taken

by

an

adjoining

landowner

will

controvert

the

otherwise mutual acquiescence between the parties. Twenty years is
long enough for a party adverse to acquiescence to note their
objection to a fence line as the boundary, especially when the
parties have expended reliable time and resources in developing
their property in reliance on the recognized boundary line.
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II. EVEN IF UNCERTAINTY WERE STILL A FACTOR IN
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE ANALYSIS, HOCKINGS FAIL
TO DESIGNATE SPECIFIC GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL
FACT TO CONTROVERT PRESUMPTION OF ACQUIESCENCE.
As Staker noted, a small line of cases following Tripp,
including Wright v. Clissold, 521 P.2d 1224 (Utah 1974), cited to
by the Hockings, unfortunately

referred

to uncertainty

in a

boundary by acquiescence context. _Id. at 422. Wright stated that
lack of uncertainty or dispute at the time the fence was erected
could be shown as a defense by the party resisting boundary by
acquiescence. See also Universal Inv. Corp. v. Kingsbury, 26 Utah
2d 35, 484 P. 2d 173 (1971).8

These cases held that the burden of

proof is upon the person asserting the defense.

Once the four

elements of boundary by acquiescence are established, the Court is
required to presume the existence of a binding agreement unless the
party who assails it proves by competent evidence that there was
actually no agreement between the adjoining landowners or there
could not have been a proper agreement. Wright, 521 P.2d at 1226.

8

The Hockings reliance in their brief on both Wright and Fuoco v. Williams, 18 Utah
2d 282, 421 P.2d 944 (1966) is misplaced. Both decisions were grounded on the affirmative
defense that the boundary line was set for a purpose other than setting a boundary. Wright
noted that the fence was erected not to locate a boundary which was uncertain, but simply
to contain cattle and thus the parties could not acquiescence in the fence as a boundary.
Id. at 1227. The language in Fuoco cited by the Hockings reaffirms that this principle. The
court held that an irrigation ditch, which was located in an area overgrown with weeds, and
which had to be periodically reestablished by plowing did not have the visibility and
persistency of placement to constitute a boundary. Id. at 947.
Neither Wright nor Fuoco are applicable to this appeal. There is no material factual
dispute that the chain-link fence in this case establishes a clear and visible boundary line.
The fence was not constructed to keep out livestock, but to serve as a boundary between
the Hocking and de la Melena lots. The real issue the Hockings raise is not whether the
fence constitutes a clear and viable boundary between residential lots, but whether the
parties acquiesced in that boundary.
17

One of the four mentioned defenses included

"the absence of a

dispute or uncertainty in fixing the boundary." Id.9
It is implicit in Staker that a showing of the absence of
uncertainty

is

no

longer

a defense

presumption of mutual acquiescence.

that

will

contradict

the

The language and logic in

Staker repudiate the factor of uncertainty altogether in a boundary
by acquiescence context.
However, even if a showing of the absence of uncertainty were
still a viable defense in a boundary by acquiescence case, the
Hockings fail to meet their burden in designating specific facts
showing such an absence.

In this case the evidence is uncontro-

verted that the fence line was fixed pursuant to an agreement
between the parties1 predecessors in interest, notwithstanding a
discrepancy the between Milt Green's 1953 survey and the warranty
deeds.

If the parties did not dispute the boundary

line, the

evidence is at least clear that the proper boundary was uncertain.
Tingey's awareness that he had purchased in 1947 100 feet from
north to south is not a material fact.

Dispositive on this point

is Universal Inv. Corp. v. Kingsbury, 26 Utah 2d 35, 484 P.2d 173
(1971).

In 1940, the parties had rebuilt a 50-year old fence

dividing lots on the same line as the old fence.

The ne*w fence was

located approximately five feet south of the line described in the
property owner's deeds.

Reversing the trial court and finding

mutual acquiescence, the supreme court held that the non-claimant
9

The other three defenses that Wright noted would rebut the presumption of a binding
agreement, included: (1) no parties available to make an agreement (i.e., sole ownership of
the property with the existing line which was later transferred in tracts to two or more
other persons; (2) the line was set for a purpose other than setting a boundary; used in and
(3) mistake or inadvertence in locating the boundary on facts that would warrant relief in
equity. Id. at 1226.
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defendant did not meet his burden in showing there was no uncertainty as to the true boundary line.

Notably, the fact that

plaintiff knew that he was aware that his deed specified 27 1/2
feet fronting from the property was insufficient to rebut the
presumption of acquiescence.

Plaintiff testified that he always

considered the fence to be the boundary.

Id. at 174.

Similarly, in this case, the Hockings advance no other facts
to show that the parties had notice when the fence line was fixed
except

for the

purchased

100

immaterial
feet

fact that

fronting

the

Tingey

property.

was

aware he had

Tingey

testified

unequivocally that he never marked off the 100 feet and regarded
the fence line to be the boundary between his property and the
Hocking lot.

With no other evidence to support their contention,

the Hockings simply fail to raise a material fact that could rebut
the presumption of acquiescence.10
There is no authority whatsoever for the notion the Hockings
advance that notice of a "true boundary line" in the fixing of a
fence line is prima facie evidence of a lack of mutual acquiescence.

Nor is showing an absence of uncertainty in such a context

a viable affirmative defense following the Staker decision.

Even

The Hockings cite Low v. Bonacci, 788 P.2d 512 (Utah 1990) for the proposition that
Tingeyfs knowledge that he purchased 100 feet from the front of de la Melena ! s lot
somehow prevents mutual acquiescence in this case. The facts recited in the Low opinion
are sparse, but based on what little is disclosed, Low is clearly distinguishable from this
case. Low found that Bonacci did not meet his burden in showing mutual acquiescence in
the fence line as the boundary between his property and appellee Colletts 1 property.
Apparently, an existing boundary was established in 1964 by a condemnation action in which
the Colletts were paid by the State for the condemned portion of the property. This Court
held that this action established acquiescence in the meets and bounds description, not in
the fence line. Id. at 513. There has been no similar action in this case that established
clear boundary lines. The evidence is conclusive that the parties have acquiesced in the
fence line as the true boundary, not the deed line or a line created by a previous legal
action.
19

if the affirmative defense still existed, the Hockings have failed
to meet their burden and show a genuine issue of material fact that
there was an absence of uncertainty in the fixing of the fence
line,
III. THE UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS ESTABLISH
THAT THERE WAS MUTUAL ACQUIESCENCE IN THE
FENCE LINE FOR A SUFFICIENT PERIOD OF TIME,
The only so-called "factual dispute" the Hockings raise on
appeal is that the 1953 survey Milt Green testified building the
fence pursuant to in sworn affidavit and deposition has not been
produced.

That de la Melena was unsuccessful in obtaining the

survey is not surprising given the date of the survey, and the fact
that Green had no need to keep the survey after 1963 when he sold
the Hocking parcel to the Madsens.

Even if Green had not built the

fence pursuant to a survey, the fact would be immaterial since
uncertainty

is no longer an element or factor in boundary

by

acquiescence cases and, even if it were, the absence of a survey
does not alone controvert the presumption of uncertainty.
The facts are uncontroverted in this case that there has been
mutual acquiescence in the fence line as a boundary.

The actions

of the adjoining landowners demonstrate unquestionably a belief
that the fence line was the true and proper boundary.

The material

facts relevant to this factor are substantially similar to those in
Staker.
record

Like Staker, in this case there is no indication in the
that the Hockings, de la Melena or any predecessor

in

interest to the two parcels behaved in a fashion inconsistent with
the belief that the fence line was a boundary.

The owners of both

the Hockings and de la Melena lots occupied houses, constructed
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buildings, farmed and irrigated only within their respective fenced
areas.
Aside from simply developing the lots within the boundaries
established by the fence line, the record is replete with undisputed evidence that the owners of the parcels openly regarded the
fence line as the true and proper boundary.

The Hockings have

carefully maintained the fence, made several repairs and improvements and have even extended the height of the fence several feet.
Also, like in Staker, there has never been any indication or
notification by either party of a disagreement of the fence line as
the boundary until the Hockings notified de la Melena in 1989 of a
dispute.

The undisputed facts conclusively prove that from 1953 to

1989, a period of thirty-six years, the owners of the two parcels
never discussed, notified or behaved in any way as to indicate a
disagreement with the fence line as the boundary.11
IV. EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES SUPPORT
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DE LA MELENA.
Not only is this case factually on point with Staker v.
Ainsworth, but the equities in this case support a judgment in
favor of de la Melena as a matter of law.

The Utah Supreme Court

has held that even where an affirmative defense is advanced to
rebut the presumption of mutual acquiescence, the equities in the
case and the public policies of eliminating litigious lawsuits may
compel a finding of acquiescence, especially where a party ignored

n

The Utah Supreme Court also applied the objective test in determining whether
adjoining owners acquiesced in a line as a boundary in Lane v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 119, 505
P.2d 1199 (1973).
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and essentially consented to the boundary.

King v. Fronk, 14 Utah

2d 135, 378 P.2d 893, 895 n.5 (1963).
It is suggested that even where mistake is
shown, there might be a case where the doctrine, based on principle of repose and elimination of litigious lawsuits may hurdle ci
mistake in the interest of settling boundaries. Each case must be viewed in the light
of its own facts, equity and public policy.
One might be mistaken, but shown to have
ignored and consented to the boundary.
Id.
The facts in this case compel a finding of mutual acquiescence.

For at least thirty-six years, the owners of the Hockings

and de la Melena lots have relied on the fence erected by the
Hockings1 predecessor in interest as the true and proper boundary.
It would be grossly unfair at this point in time, some thirty-six
years later, to consider the fence as anything but a fixed boundary
line, especially in light of the reliance of the property owners in
developing their property consonant with the fence as a boundary
line.

Moving the fence would disrupt an established sprinkling

system, causing lines to be moved and result in expenses for the
reconstruction of a lengthy fence.

Moreover, all the Hockings

stand to lose by maintaining the fence line is a strip of land they
have never used, or indicated a desire to use.
IV.

HOCKINGS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO COSTS.

De la Melena!s counsel is reluctant to dignify with a response
the Hockings' allegation that de la Melena?s counsel have violated
professional rules of conduct. Their allegation, not taken lightly
by de la Melena's counsel, is offensive, scandalous and bizarre.
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A party is obviously never obligated to another party to sue that
party.
Appellee recognizes the frustration the Hockings have had with
a system they have not fully understood as pro se advocates, but
accusing counsel of unethical conduct with reckless abandon is
hardly justified.
CONCLUSION
The Hockings have failed to state any grounds that the trial
court erred in its summary judgment for de la Melena. Accordingly,
the trial court's order should be affirmed in all respects.
DATED this V"

day of March, 1992.
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS

MICHAEL T. ROBERTS
Attorneys for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I herewith certify that I am a member of and/or employed in
the law firm of Campbell, Maack & Sessions, One Utah Center,
Thirteenth Floor, 201 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah and
in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 26, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF
OF RESPONDENT were mailed, postage prepaid, on this ^
March, 1992, to the following:
Martin L. and Judith C. Hocking
349 East Center Street
Centerville, UT 84014
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH

MARTIN L. HOCKING, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
MERLYN TINGEY ROBERTS, et al.,
Defendants.

]
]>
|
])
;

RULING ON MOTIONS
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 900748579

Both the plaintiff and defendant filed motions for summary
judgment. The motions were heard on September 3, 1991, with the
plaintiff appearing pro se and the defendant represented by
Michael T. Roberts. After oral argument the Court took the
motions under advisement.
The defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.
There is no genuine issue of material fact.
Milton C. Green was a previous owner of the Hockings'
property, and, in 1953, pursuant to a survey, erected a
chain-link fence that still serves as a boundary between what is
now the Hocking and de la Melena lots. William Tingey owned de
la Melena's property from 1947 to 1978. Tingey cultivated,
irrigated and farmed the de la Melena lot and acquiesced in the
1953 chain-link fence as a boundary line between the two
parcels. Milton C. Green and William Tingey agreed that the
fence would constitute a boundary between their property. Both
plaintiffs and defendants obtained surveys over the years and
each learned at some point in time that the fence line and the
legal title line was 12 feet off. The discrepancy was not
discussed until October 10, 1989, when the plaintiffs notified
the defendants they were claiming the disputed 12 feet.
The memorandum of the parties clearly set out the

controlling case law that would permit this Court to rule in the
defendant's

favor, especially

in a recent Utah

ruling, Staker v. Ainsworth, 785P.2d 417, 420
Staker,

the

Court

indicated

that

a

fence

Supreme

Court

(Utah 1990).

relied

upon

In

as

a

boundary is superior over the boundary of record so long as the
elements

of boundary

by acquiescence

are

in place.

elements of boundary by acquiescence are:
a visible

line marked

Id.

The

(1) occupation up to

by monuments, fences, or building;

mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary;

(2)

(3) for a long

period of time (20 years as the minimum, generally) ; and (4) by
adjoining
P.2d

landowners.

447,

448

acquiescence
1953,

a

(Utah

was

1981).

the

interest,

and

landowers,

erected
relied

interest,

eventually

(citing

elements to the

fence

interest

Id.

the

Applying

by
upon

by

plaintiffs'

up

father

and

Hockings

and

7

plaintiffs

the

defendants'
until

Wilkinson,

629

boundary

by

the

the

defendant

Roberts'

v.

instant case, we

plaintiffs,
the

Goodman

find that
predecessors

in

predecessors

in

predecessor

in

1989.

Green

to

Roberts, relied

from

The

adjoining

begin
on

with

the

demarcate their property for more than 35 years.

and

fence

to

An affidavit

by Green indicates that an earlier fence separated the property
at the same spot as the one installed by Green in 1953.

Thus,

defendants as a matter of law are entitled to the land separated
by

the

fenced

boundary

rather

than

the

titles

of

record

according to the common law doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.
The

plaintiffs

facts

or

they

(1969)

indicate
plaintiffs

law.
that

do

not

Plaintiffs
and

the

there

provide

no

proof

realized

a

fence

years was off by 12 feet.

the

that

(1978)

mutual
that

boundary issue when drawn up.
plaintiffs

with

maintain

defendant
was

no

agree

Court's

earlier
had

summary

surveys

ordered

acquiescence.
such

surveys

of

that

somehow
However,

raised

the

It was not until 1989 that the

line

in effect

for more

than

30

The plaintiffs simply have no legal

or factual ground on which to premise any motion of summary
judgment.
Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of the
defendant seems required according to Utah law.
The plaintiffs7 motion seeking reimbursement for attorney's
and paralegals fees is denied. If the plaintiffs feel they have
a cause of action against their former attorney the remedy is to
file an action against him.
The defendants are directed to draw a formal order based
upon this ruling.
Dated September 25, 1991.
BY THE COURT:

JudgeV^7
Certificate of Mailing:
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to:
Martin L. Hocking
Judith C. Hocking
349 East Center Street
Centerville, UT 84014

Michael T. Roberts
First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
SLC, UT 84101-1605

Dated this <P^5^n day of September 1991.

/2a^7

Deputy Cl{^rk
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MARTIN L. HOCKINGS, and
JUDITH C. HOCKINGS,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 900748579

MERLYN TINGY ROBERTS, n/d/k
MERLYN TINGY DE LA MELENA,
Defendant.

DEPOSITION UPON ORAL EXAMINATION OF:
WILLIAM TINGY

TAKEN AT:

DATE:

243 East 400 South, #200, Salt Lake City, Utah

December 14, 1990

REPORTED BY:

Jody Edwards,

CSR

CAPITOL
REPORTERS
175 South Main. #510
Salt Lake City. Utah 84 i l l

(801)363-7939
^
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6
A

Eighty-one.

Q

And are you familiar with the property that is the

subject of this lawsuit?
A

Yes.

Q

And just for the record, this is the property which

is currently owned by your daughter, Merlyn Roberts de la
Melena?
A

Yes.

Q

Is that correct?

A

Yes.

Q

At one time that property was owned by yourself, do

you recall that?
A

Yes.

Q

Can you tell me when you first purchased the lot in

question?
A

November the 19th, 1947.

Q

And from whom did you purchase that property?

A

William Evans.

Q

Do you recall the dimensions of that lot when you

bought it?
A

Yes, to this extent, he said, I will sell you 100

feet from north to south.
Q

Okay. What did you do with the lot when you bought

it from Mr. Evans?
A

Cleaned some dead trees and rocks off and started —

JODY EDWARDS —

CAPITOL REPORTERS

1

and farmed it.

2

Q

And what type of agriculture did you farm on that?

3

A

Well, produce; squash, beans.

4

MRS. TINGY:

5

THE WITNESS:

6

Q

Peas.
Peas, that type of produce.

(BY MR. HUNT)

Okay.

And so it was your

7

understanding when you bought the lot that you only had 100

8

feet from north to south?

9

A

Correct.

10

Q

Okay.

Now, aft'er you bought the lot from Mr. Evans,

11

you changed the title or the ownership of the lot to Tingy

12

Real Estate, do you recall that?

13
14

A

It was in our name. You mean when we —

other

ground that we —

15

Q

No. Well, I know you've owned other parcels.

16

A

Okay.

17
18
19

August the 8th, 1963, for —

common for estate planning.
Q

Okay.

Who did you change the title to at that time,

Mr. Tingy, just to yourselves?

20

A

Yes, we were —

21

Q

Okay.

22
23
24
25

as tenant in

And at some point subsequent, after 1963, did

you change it to a corporation?
A

In December —

yes, December the 20th, 1971 we

turned it to Tingy Real Estate, Incorporated.
Q

Okay.

And then after that you sold it or conveyed

JODY EDWARDS —
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1

A

Yes.

2

Q

Several years ago?

3

A

Yes, after we had the property.

4

Q

Thatfs correct.

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

All right. And did you have any idea of where the

7
8
9
10
11

fence was placed in relationship to the boundary on your lot?
A

I did not.

I was never asked to participate with

the fence, financially or any other way, I never was.
Q

Was there a fence between that property before this

chain link fence was built?

12

A

No, there was not. Wil Evans owned the whole half a

13

block there.

14

Q

Okay.

15

A

He owned their lot and also the rock house out on

16

the corner.

17

Q

How did you farm that ground, then?

How did you

18

know where to farm when you were farming it?

19

that in 1947. How far did you plow and irrigate?

20
21

A

And you started

Well, we didn't have a survey then, I imagine we

just decided on a —

I just plowed the same area every year.

22

Q

And so you went back 100 feet and stopped?

23

A

Yes, that's right.

24

Q

Okay.

25

Other than just your plowing and your

irrigating, there was no differentiation between the north

JODY EDWARDS —
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side of that block and the south side, then?
A

No.

Q

I see. And so the first fence to come up was the

chain link fence?
A

Correct, yes.

Q

Did you notice that it did not correspond with the

place that you were plowing and irrigating?
A

You're referring to this (indicating)?

Q

I am.

A

No, I did not.

In fact, I did not know that there

was a discrepancy until this came up.
I —

I have to admit that

maybe I should have done, but I did not know that there

was a discrepancy on the line, property line, until this came
up a few years ago.
Q

When's the first time you recall hearing about the

fact that the fence wasn't on the property line?
A

I can't tell you the date?

When did you make the

first request?
Q

The record needs to understand, you're looking at

the Hockings and asking the Hockings?
A

Yes. Maybe they could give me a —

Q

Maybe I can rephrase the question so we can keep it

just you testifying instead of the Hockings?
A

Oh, all right.

Q

What you're saying to me is that you didn't know

JODY EDWARDS —
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1

about the discrepancy in the fence line until —

2
3

A

I did not.

I did not and I paid no attention. I

had no idea that it was not on the correct line.

4

Q

I see. Now, when you sold your property or conveyed

5

it to your daughter, Merlyn Roberts at that time, didn't you

6

order a survey?

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

Okay.

9

What you have in front of you is Exhibit 1,

which is the survey.

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

And did you see that survey at that time when

12

you

—

13

A

I assume that I did, but I paid no attention to it

14

whatsoever.

15

could use the lot for collateral to build her home.

As I remember, the survey was made so that she

16

Q

I see.

17

A

And she used both lots.

We understood that there

18

were two lots there. We always figured there was two lots and

19

she used both lots as collateral to build the home.

20

Q

All right.

But you didn't notice —

21

A

I didn't even keep the survey, we gave it to her.

22

Q

I see.

In the course of your using the lot before

23

you gave it to your daughter, did you plow right up to the

24

fence?

25

A

Yes, yes, as close as I could get to it to keep the

JODY EDWARDS —
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weeds down.
Q

But before the fence was up, you only went back 100

feet?
A

That's all.

Q

Didn't it strike you as odd that you went back

another 12 feet further?
A

No, it didn't.

I don't remember.

I'd have to say

no to that.
Q

I realize it's a year or two ago and that there's

been a lot of water under the bridge, or a lot of water down
the ditch I guess in Utah that's how you say it. A lot of
water down the ditch, all right.

Did you order this survey

for your daughter?
A

Yes.

Q

You did?

A

Yes.

Q

All right.

But you don't recall if you looked at i

or even saw that the fence line was in the wrong place?
A

I don't recall, no.

line was in the —

I did not know that the fence

not on the property line.

Q

And so —

A

I had no reason to know until an objection came up.

Q

Okay.

A

We had the survey —

Q

And you never talked about it with him?

But you did have the survey, it was there?

JODY EDWARDS —
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1
2

Q

All right.

Did anybody talk to you before the

Hockings did about the fence being in the wrong place?

3

A

No, no one.

4

Q

No one ever raised that issue?

5

A

No one.

6

Q

Not even the people that owned the property before

7

the Hockings?

8

A

No, no one.

9

Q

So you have no recollection at all about the fence?

10

A

I do not. And there's been two residents in the

11

east side since the fence was put up.

12

mean?

Do you know what I

13

Q

Okay.

14

A

There's been two, Reed Pratt lived there and his

15

wife, and Helmit Wenzel lives there now.

16

the home east of the Hockings. And there was never a

17

discussion about the property line with those two.

18
19

Q

That's referring to

Because this strip goes over into the Wenzel

property, too, does it not?

20

A

It does.

21

Q

And the Wenzels have never said anything to you

22
23
24
25

about it?
A

No, they have never mentioned one word to me, not

since our daughter has —
Q

They did mention it to her?
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1

A

No, she mentioned to it them.

2

Q

She mentioned it to them, okay.

3

Did anybody mention

it to your family that you're aware of?

4

A

No.

5

Q

Even if they didn't mention it to you?

6

A

Other than Merlyn, no. Absolutely no, no one has

7
8
9

been interested in it.
Q

Okay.

But you think that somebody may have

mentioned it to Merlyn, but not to you?

10

A

I'm sure the Hockings did.

11

Q

Okay.

12
13

(Off the record discussion.)
Q

(BY MR. HUNT)

Mr. Tingy, when you were farming the

14

ground initially back in 1948, 1949 and so on until the fence

15

went up in 1953, did you notice that when you started farming

16

to the fence that you were getting more production per acre

17

off of that ground?

18

A

No, I did not.

19

Q

Okay.

You see because there's about 30 percent more

20

on that lot with that additional 12 foot strip, and I wondered

21

if you noticed that there was any increase in production off

22

of that property?

23

A

No, I did not.

I would assume that I was plowing

24

right over and that was where the fence is now was the

25

property line. Do you know what I mean?

JODY EDWARDS —
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1

was the line.

2

the plow at all.

3
4

Q

I don't remember going out ten more feet with

But you must have.

It seems to me that you must

have.

5

A

Well, if —

6

Q

If you were going 100 feet and all of the sudden the

7

fence was 112 feet —

8

A

Unless I was over there before.

9

Q

Oh, now I haven't thought of that?

10

A

It could be.

11

Q

You might have over plowed the original lot, is what

12
13

you're saying, because there was no prior fence?
A

Well, Evans never established the point.

I don't

14

remember who did, but he never did.

15

we never did establish the point. And I assume that we

16

stepped it off, somebody did, and established the 100 feet

17

back.

18
19

Q

Okay.

He and I, as I remember,

And you don't recall one year going 100 feet

and the next year going 112 feet?

20

A

No.

21

Q

And you didn't remember getting a substantial

22
23
24
25

increase of your crop off that?
A

No, when you pick zucchini you don't know whether

you've got 100 or —
Q

I'm with you if that's what you had on there.

JODY EDWARDS —
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1

sorry, it's been a long week and that's humerus. Okay.

2

Zucchini is zucchini, isn't it?

3

A

Right.

4

MR. HUNT:

Off the record again.

5

(Off the record discussion.)

6

MR. HUNT:

7

MR. ROBERTS:

8 I

(Deposition concluded at 3:40 p.m.)

I don't any other questions.
I don't have any questions.

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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A

Mm-hm.

Q

Do you follow what I'm talking about there?

A

Yes, I follow that.

Q

Do you know who built that fence line?

A

That fence line that's in there, I built.

Q

You built?

A

Yep.

Q

When did you build that fence line?

A

Well, I can't put it right to the day, but

it was within a year or two after I -Q

Sometime in 1953 or 1954?

A

Yep.

Q

Was there an existing fence line or base

where the fence line is that you built that existed
previously?
A

Right.

The property behind me was owned by

Bill Tingy when I moved there.
Q

Now, the property you're talking about that

was owned by Bill Tingy, is that now owned by
Mrs. Merlyn De La Melena, known as Mrs. Roberts to you?
A

Right, to me.

fence line, you know.

And there was an old pioneer

Wasn't in great repair, but there

were sufficient posts at that line that well indicated
what the line was at that time.
on it.

And there was some wire

Wouldn't turn livestock or anything, but you

7

1
2
3
4

could tell at one time it was a good fence, you know.
Q

Now, this prior fence line, do you know how

long that fence line had been in existence?
A

Oh, good Lord.

The way it looked it had to

5

be 50 years or so old.

6

by very early settlers in the valley.

7

here all my life, and I know a fence that was built by

8

pioneers, you know, by looking at it.

9

wouldn't hazard to guess how long, but it was a long,

10
11
12
13

I'd imagine it was a fence built
I've lived around

And so I -

I

long time.
Q

Did you happen to take a survey prior to

building or repairing this fence line?
A

Yes.

Therice Duncan had to furnish me a

14

survey for the title company when -- because of the fact

15

that there's a lot of defugilty with the east-west lines

16

in Centerville.

17

survey of the property when I bought it from Therice.

And so the title company required a

18

Now, I can't remember exactly how close that

19

back line survey was to that fence, but I know that Bill

20

and I, which was customary --

21

Q

Bill Tingy?

22

A

Bill Tingy.

-- looked it over, and the

23

survey line was within reasonable distance of the old

24

fence there, you know, a foot or two or whatever.

25

can't remember exactly.

But there was no question

I

either in my mind nor his that that fence line was close
enough.
Q

For the survey?

A

For the survey.

Q

So this survey was ordered by Therice

So have at it, he says.

Duncan?
A

Right.

Q

Was this prior to your moving into the home,

prior to purchasing this home?
A

No, not really.

It was a week or two after,

because, you know, I knew Therice, he knew me.

We knew

if there was any problems we'd work them out.
Q

Do you remember who took the survey?

A

I think it was Great Basin.

Q

But you're not sure.

A

Great Basin Engineering, but I'm not right

positive.

years.

But it seems to me that's who it was.

Q

Do you still have a copy of that survey?

A

No.

I've been gone from that property for

And I'd imagine Great Basin would if -- or

Security Title would be more likely to have it because
they are were the ones that actually ordered the survey,
because they wouldn't write the title insurance on it
without a survey.

They wouldn't take -- because of the

problems over there on the east-west lines, they would

9

1

never write a title policy on a piece of property in

2

Centerville without a survey.

3

Q

But as far as you can recollect, then,

4

Mr. Tingy and you both reviewed the survey and agreed

5

that the fence line would be where it's at?

6

A

Yep.

7

Q

Were you aware -- I guess I'm asking a

8

question you've already answered, but let me ask it

9

anyway.

10
11
12
13

Were you aware then that the fence line was not

on the deed line, the property deed line?
A

What are you asking me, Mike, that I wasn't

aware'that it was -Q

Were you aware at all of a discrepancy

14

between the fence line and the deed description on your

15

warranty deed?

16

A

None whatsoever.

We didn't -- in those

17

days, you know -- and if I remember correctly, that

18

measurement comes from center of roads up there.

19

so, you know -- in the old days we followed the old

20

fence lines.

21

Q

And

Did anyone ever say to you at anytime or

22

make any indication to you or infer in any way of a

23

discrepancy between the fence line and the deed

24

description?

25

A

Never.

10

1
2

Q

Did Mr. Tingy ever say anything to you with

regard to a discrepancy between the fence line?

3

A

Never.

4

Q

When did you first learn of this

5

discrepancy, or have you heard of it prior to today?

6

A

Well, yeah, but it hasn't been very long

7

ago.

Merlyn Roberts, who has been a friend of mine --

8

she was Bill Tingy's daughter, and I've known her ever

9

since she was about the size of Hector's pup.

And

10

she -- 'cause she called me and said that there had b°en

11

a question arise on that line and asked me a few

12

questions similar to what we're discussing here today.

13
14

And that's the first time that I ever heard
of any discrepancy on that property line.

15

Q

The Madsen's, who purchased the property

16

from you, did they ever ask or make any sort of inquiry

17

or any kind of a statement with regard to the fence

18

line?

19

A

Never.

20

Q

So as far as you knew and understood, you

21

and Mr. Tingy were in agreement that the fence line was

22

the appropriate boundary?

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

Did you ever use this disputed strip

25

indicated in the survey, this 12 feet between the fence

11

1
2
3

line and the deed line?
A

No.

Bill farmed his side of the fence, and

I farmed mine.

4

Q

5

recall?

6

A

Did he farm right up to the fence; do you

Yeah, pretty close.

There was some old wild

7

roses there, and, you know, most farmers would harrow as

8

close as they could get to the fence without tucking

9

onto the roses and jerking the fence out.

10

And so it seems to me like he left a little

11

strip, maybe three or four feet, that he didn't keep the

12

weeds down, but he got up as close -- if my memory

13

serves me, there's a difference in elevation a little

14

bit, was when I moved there, and the fence was on the

15

high side.

16

Haven't looked at it for years, but it seems to me

17

that's the way it was when I lived there.

18

pretty close to that fence.

19
20

MR. ROBERTS:

But he got up

Off the record for just a

minute.

21
22

I'm a little higher than that property.

(A discussion was held off the record.)
Q

(By Mr. Roberts)

During the ten years that

23

you owned this property, was there any dispute between

24

you and Mr. Tingy as to the fence line?

25

A

Never.

12

Q

Never any dispute at all?

A

(The witness shakes his head,)

Q

Or was there any dispute that was brought

to your attention from that time that you sold the
property to the Madsen's up until the time that you
spoke of earlier when Ms. De La Melena brought it to
your attention?
A

Never.
MR. ROBERTS:

That's all the questions I

have.
MR. HOCKINGS:
MR. ROBERTS:

Can we ask a couple?
You may do so.

EXAMINATION
BY MR. HOCKINGS:
Q

I'd like to know if Mr. Green gave

Mr. Madsen a survey when you sold to him.
A

I don't think so.

I know I furnished

Mr. Madsen with the title policy.

And as a general

rule, when you're selling real estate, that suffices for
the buyer if he gets a title policy.
Now, if the title company thinks that they
ought to have a survey -- just like the case when I
bought it from Therice -- they'll request one.
But in my case we had already had it

13
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(By Mr. Hunt)
Q.

How would you describe the property at the

time you purchased it?
A.

Just some land.

Q.

Would you call it a vacant lot?

A.

It was a field.

Q.

Did it have any kind of grass or vegetation

A field?

on it?
A.

It probably had some vegetation on it from

field, farm produce.
Q.

Let me ask the obvious question, then.

Had

it been used by your father in his truck farming
business?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And was it a field in which he grew

vegetables or produce?
A.

Vegetables, yes.

Q.

And was it currently in that type of use

when you purchased it?
A.

Yes.

Q.

How long was it from the time of your

purchase on February 14th, 1978, until you built or
erected a home?
A.

We began building right -- I think -- let f s

see, this was in April -- or February?
month.

About a

We started planning the home and it was

Rockie Dustin * Capitol Reporters
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(By Mr. Hunt)
completed in September of that same year.

We moved in

in September.
Q.

Of 1978?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you occupied the home at that point in

A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you have any idea how long your father

time?

had owned this property prior to his transfer to his
corporation and then to you?
A.

I don't know in years.

I don't know.

It's

been a long time.
Q.

Let me take you back to the time when you

purchased the property on February 14th of 1978.

Did

you obtain a survey of that property?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And in that packet of documents right by

your right hand there is a survey that has a date in
the lower left hand corner of February 21, 1978, and
that would be marked as Exhibit 2?
A.

Right.

Q.

Did you order that survey to be surveyed on

your property?
A.

I personally didn't.

Q.

Can you tell me who did?

Rockie Dustin * Capitol Reporters
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A.

Bill and Sylvia Tingey did.

Q.

Your folks?

A.

Yes.

Q.

On your behalf?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you ever have an occasion to look at

that survey?
A.

I probably looked at it when I got it, and

then I probably looked at it when I was going to sel
my house.
Q.

Did you sell your house?

A.

When I was going to sell my house.

Q.

When were you going to sell your house?

A.

In 1989.

Q.

But at the time that you received it in

1978, you looked at it as well, did you not?
A.

I probably did, because I had it in my

possession.
Q.

And were you aware at that time that the

fence that was on the property was not at your
property line?
A.

I personally did not have that knowledge.

Q.

You did not?

A.

No.

Q.

Did your father?

Rockie Dustin * Capitol Reporters
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A.

I don't remember specifically.

If they

asked for it, we would have given it to them, but I
don't remember
Q.

specifically.

Did your husband take part in these

transactions as well?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Is he still alive?

A.

No.

Q.

Do you retain all the files of whatever was

accumulated at that time?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Would you please tell me what took place,

after you built your house in 1978, with the property
to the west of your home, and particularly the 12-foot
strip that borders the Hocking's property, which is
approximately 12 feet by 120 feet.
A.

On that strip there, we put raspberries.

And there is a little fence, just for all the
berries.
bushes.

I put some other bushes there, fruit-bearing
I have the fruit trees, lawn.

There is a

sprinkling system.
Q.

And can you tell me the date that these were

installed?
A.

Oh, probably the first -- within the first

five years that we lived there.

I don't know exact

Rockie Dustin * Capitol Reporters
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dates.
Q.

But it was after you received the survey of

February of 1978?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And did you put them in that portion on the

survey?

You are welcome to look at that document.

have highlighted that in yellow so you can see.

I

Are

those plants that you have described, and sprinkling
system, within that portion?
A.

Some of them.

Q.

And do they come right up to the -MR. STAHLE:

Just a second, Hollis.

Off the

record.
(Discussion off the record.)
Q.

Let me redirect my question, and I

appreciate that correction, I'm talking about the
south border of your property, the north border of the
Hocking's property.

I think you understood what I was

talking about, but I misspoke, and I appreciate that
correction.
Would your answer be the same if we make
that correction from west to south?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And so those plants and sprinkling system,

does it come right up to the existing fence, the

Rockie Dustin * Capitol Reporters
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sprinkling system?
A.

I think it's pretty close.

Part of it is.

Some of it is.
Q.

Tell me what kind of sprinkling system it

A.

Rain Bird.

Q.

Isn't it correct that all of those

is.

improvements were put in after your survey of February
21st, 1978?
A.

Right.

Q.

Can you tell me what is immediately -- and

again looking at Exhibit No. 2 -- what is immediately
north of that 12-foot strip that's highlighted?
A.

Garden.

Q.

Is it a garden?

A.

Yes.

Q.

You have not installed, erected or built any

other buildings immediately adjacent to that strip?
A.

No.

Q.

Can you tell me how far away from the strip

that the nearest building or house is?

That would be

going from the yellow strip to your home, or garage,
or what other improvements you would have on that
property.
A.

My house.

Rockie Dustin * Capitol Reporters
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paid taxes on the strip referred to as the 12-foot by
120-foot strip of land?
A.

We paid taxes on the description in our

Q.

And are you aware that your deeded

deed.

description does not include that 12-foot strip?
A.

I am now.

Q.

And weren't you aware of that in 1978?

A.

No, I was not.

Q.

Was your husband?

A.

He may have, but it would be kind of hard t

find out.
Q.

I understand that.

And I don't pretend to

have those kinds of powers.
At any time since 1978, when you purchased
your property -- when the property was deeded to you
as a gift from your parents, have you ever attempted
to pay taxes on this 12-foot strip?
A.

No.

Q.

Your counsel has filed an answer and a

counterclaim to the Hocking's complaint against you,
and they assert on your behalf that in fact you claim
that property as your own, the 12-foot by 120-foot
strip; is that correct?

I realize you did not draft

this document, and I'm not trying to put you in --
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